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andpower is financially costly, politically contentious, exacts a high
human price, and impossible to assess until after the fact. It is of apparently
questionable value for preserving security in unstable states or maintaining the
benefits of kinetic operations. It has been a truism for sixty years never to
conduct a major land war in Asia. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates suggested to an audience at West Point, one also might now add the Middle East
and even Africa to that admonition.1 The list of potential theaters of operations
seems to be growing thin, increasingly restricted to regions where major war
appears unlikely to occur in the near future, where landpower is apparently
unnecessary. Has landpower lost its utility? Will landpower be circumscribed
to increasingly smaller roles, lighter footprints, and more limited missions? The
expenses and dangers of employing landpower are genuine.
Nonetheless, landpower is unique in its capability to deliver strategic
effect through the taking and exercise of control. No other grand strategic
instrument, military or nonmilitary, can achieve a similar effect. Yet neither
the strength nor the dangers inherent in using landpower should be considered
in isolation; they are inextricably intertwined and form the basis for employing
landpower in the future.

Grand Strategy
Grand strategy concerns the control of manifold forms of power in
competitive relationships. Such multifariousness is a necessary aspect of
the relationship between grand strategy and the control of power. Professor
Colin Gray suggests “[i]f the concept of grand strategy is to have intellectual
integrity it has to admit a necessary connection to military force as a, not the
only, defining characteristic.”2 In the competition for control, recourse to force
must remain an available option despite the existence of and the need for other
relationships and other tools (diplomacy, sanctions, propaganda, etc.). Edward
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Luttwak argues “[t]he boundaries of grand strategy are wide, but they do not
encompass all the relationships of all participants in the totality of international
politics”; instead they depend upon the potential to use force as a meaningful
instrument.3 The possible reciprocal application of force within the framework
of a political competition defines grand strategy and distinguishes it from
statecraft, although in practice the line separating the two is, and can only be,
indistinct.
The aim of grand strategy is to control the mutually adversarial and
interwoven pattern of power manipulation—of events around and during conflict—in time and space. Control of space is meaningless if it is not temporally
durable, just as control of events is meaningless if those events are isolated from
the theater of a competitive relationship. Control is nevertheless finite both
spatially and temporally, for the means to control are ultimately limited—in
magnitude, in capability, by geography, etc. Control is not entirely zero-sum,
but is instead a trichotomous concept: one may deny control to others, one may
take it for oneself, and one may subsequently exercise it. Denial of control to
the enemy is implicit in acquisition and exercise of control, but the latter two are
not necessary features of the former. One may deny control to another without
being able to acquire and exercise it oneself.

Tools of Grand Strategy
The unique capacity of landpower to take control and subsequently
exercise it may be juxtaposed with how all the other tools of grand strategy
influence the competition for control. These tools, both military and nonmilitary, deny control of particular exercises of power to the opponent, to varying
extents and dependent upon the context.
Economic sanctions and blockades constrain the ability of the target
to manipulate its economic power at will, thus restricting its internal power
creation mechanisms. Propaganda and psychological operations contest the
opponent’s narrative and impair his capacity for controlling the opinions of his
population and influencing the attitudes of the international audience. Special
operations demonstrate and exploit the adversary’s inability to secure his valuable assets, whether they are heavy-water plants attacked by commandos or
nuclear enrichment facilities assaulted from cyberspace. Diplomacy, the art of
negotiation and persuasion, achieves effect by an agreed-upon mutual limitation of control of power in specific contexts. All these tools ultimately only deny
control, by coercive or even noncoercive means. They limit what the opponent
may do and impair his strategy. They cannot directly exploit or broaden the
options for manipulating one’s own power for positive strategic ends.
Seapower and airpower, which together with landpower comprise the
three greatest military instruments of grand strategy, only deny control as
well. Men can neither live on the sea nor in the air, where their presence is
platform-based and temporary, although the ability to persist in both mediums
is impressive. Such limitation to denial of control is due to the nature of their
respective mediums and of transitory operations within these mediums. The
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geography-exclusive ability to take and exercise control—command of the sea
or air—translates only into denial of control at the grand strategic level.
In his elucidation of the principles of maritime strategy, the prominent naval historian Sir Julian Stafford Corbett remarked upon this limitation
by noting that “[s]ince men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great
issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest
cases—either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and
national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your
army to do.” Moreover, the enemy may “remove his fleet from the board altogether,” completely out of reach of one’s own fleet (before the advent of aircraft
capable of striking ships in port).4 Overwhelming strength on one side may
meet self-abnegation of naval ambitions on the other. The stronger party denies
the weaker one the ability to exercise his own naval power, but the power of
the navy only extends so far into the littoral. The effect of airpower is similar.
The interwar airpower theorist Giulio Douhet argued that countries “should
be defended from aerial attack . . . by preventing the enemy from flying.”5
The first aim of airpower strategy is to deny the enemy the ability to exercise
his airpower. The second aim of airpower is to deny the enemy the ability
to control the rest of his forces. John Warden, Douhet’s modern counterpart,
suggests that “[a]s the death of the king on the field of battle meant defeat for
his forces, so the effective isolation of the command structure [by airpower]
in modern war has led to the rapid defeat of dependent forces.”6 The denial of
control postulated by Warden’s theory does not, however, translate into effective acquisition and exercise of control for oneself; it only facilitates both by
decreasing the effectiveness of the hostile armed forces.
The practice and effect of both seapower and airpower are thus predicated on denying the enemy the external control necessary to project his own
power into that specific medium of warfare. This basis then allows the denying
strategist to extend that denial toward some aspects of the opponent’s internal
control of his own power. Widespread denial may, in its theoretical absolute
form, instigate such a lack of control in the adversary that the targeted political
entity may be entirely destroyed. No such instance in historical practice comes
readily to mind, although it is arguable that during World War II, Japan might
have reached this deadly point had it not surrendered first.

The Strength of Landpower
Having a strategy implies possessing the ambition to contest deliberately the control of some or all aspects of the enemy’s power manipulation.
One may be denied control over some particular uses of power and yet retain
a coherent strategy for succeeding, albeit one of limited effectiveness. But to
face an opponent who has taken control and is exercising it comprehensively
is to discover one’s strategy broken, and the need to improvise a response.
Herbert Rosinski, an authority on naval strategy, described this condition:
“Control being the element which differentiates true strategic action from a
haphazard series of improvisations.”7 Taking control reduces one’s adversary
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to disorganized reaction of a character far removed from the Clausewitzian
concept of defense as awaiting the blow with the aim of parrying it to gain a
strategically meaningful victory.8 Forcing the enemy to haphazard improvisation robs the foe’s defensive action of strategic meaning, unless another factor
intervenes, such as the attacker reaching his culminating point of victory—
as German forces did in the Soviet Union by the end of 1941. Subsequently
exercising control exploits this advantage by removing more and more of the
adversary’s bases of power from his possession, further degrading his ability
to act strategically.
Removing a base of power from an enemy’s purview through the exercise of control is significantly different from merely denying him access to it.
Removal is a definitive action; denial is not. The crucial difference between
removal and denial rests within the nature of military force, identified by
American economist and nuclear games theorist Thomas Schelling as its three
fundamental uses. The first two uses comprise “seizing and holding, disarming
and confining, penetrating and obstructing.” They are taking and protecting.
The third is hurting. “In addition to taking and protecting things of value it can
destroy value . . . . It is measured in the suffering it can cause and the victims’
motivation to avoid it.”9 Denial of a power base is predicated upon hurting the
enemy without taking from him. Mere abandonment of the denial campaign
returns control, albeit possibly compromised, to the enemy. Removal of a
power base is taking from the enemy by force once control has been exercised.
To restore his control, the adversary must engage in offensive action. Land
alone enables the taking and exercise of control.
The establishment and exercise of control require forces to be able to
take, limiting their use to conflict on land, the sole dimension that may be taken.
Humans live, work, and travel freely solely on land. To take something means
to draw a line in the sand, literally and figuratively, to distinguish between one
party’s belongings and the other’s, and to successfully defend that division as
necessary. Taking is the action of a single moment, although its consequences
may have to be defended over time. The strategist gains a disproportionate role
in controlling the subsequent character of events and of mutual power manipulation, for he combines denial of control to the adversary with the ability to
create new opportunities for exploitation. This is the exercise of control, which
is the consistent ability to remove, and the action of removing, power bases
from the opponent’s ownership to effect a downward spiral of the foe’s strategic
effectiveness. This stage in strategy and war is rarely reached, for most wars
end before then. It is so rare there is a special name for conflicts that escalate
to this point—total wars—although their sheer magnitude has made such an
impression on strategic studies that all other wars are defined in opposition to
them, as limited wars. Total wars indicate that ultimately the center of gravity
of any conflict is on the land, the heart of control and of human existence. There
can be no total war without a dominant land dimension to the warfare and to
the ultimate victory.
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The potential to take and actually exercise control is the core of the
difference between landpower and all other tools, military and nonmilitary, of
grand strategy. Landpower, because it alone has the capability to take and then
to exercise control on the decisive geography of war, is the unique tool capable
of and necessary for imposing one’s will upon the enemy directly and actively.
Short of nuclear war, only landpower is capable of escalating a conflict to a level
that may result in the destruction of entire great powers.
Even the major theorists of guerilla warfare recognized this, for
insurgency is not landpower—it, like airpower or seapower, may only deny
control. Of the four major theorists and practitioners of guerrilla warfare—T.E.
Lawrence, Che Guevara, Mao Tsetung, and Vo Nguyen Giap—only Lawrence
did not conclude with a vision of the guerrilla force turning into a conventional army trained, armed, and ultimately employed to take control of the
enemy state. This omission was likely due to his particular context: General
Allenby automatically fulfilled that role for him in Palestine, as commander
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. The latter three theorists all recognized
that successful insurgents would eventually have to throw away their guerrilla
advantage and wield landpower.
Landpower, for these reasons, is fortissimus inter pares, the strongest
among equals. It alone can achieve the greatest strategic and political effect,
through taking and exercising control as required by the specific grand strategic situation. No other tool of grand strategy can achieve as much—although
this is not to denigrate any of those other tools. Landpower, after all, cannot be
projected to distant lands without seapower providing it with transport, to identify but one example. Landpower can almost never be autonomous. American
Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie reflects upon this relationship: “the soldier, few men
realize, is the only one of the military men who cannot do his part of the war
alone. . . . His flanks are bare, his rear is vulnerable, and he looks aloft with a
cautious eye. He needs the airman and the sailor for his own security in doing
his own job.” Nevertheless, he is equally adamant “[t]he ultimate determinant
in war is the man on the scene with the gun. This man is the final power in
war. He is control. He determines who wins.”10 He is the soldier, and land is his
environment.

The Bravery of Landpower
Fortissimus inter pares translates not only as the strongest among
equals. It has a second, equally important, meaning: bravest among equals.
Taking and exercising control are the engines of achieving the greatest effect.
They are actions with a positive purpose, creating a new, amenable pattern of
power manipulation out of the old. Therein lies the first aspect of the bravery
in committing landpower to solve a political problem. Taking and protecting,
two of Schelling’s three fundamental uses of force, are both more difficult to
achieve than simply hurting.
Taking and exercising control through the application of landpower to
achieve positive purpose serve not merely to acquire and enjoy a position of
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strength versus one’s opponent strategically. Depending upon the success of
his military strategy as landpower asserts control, a strategist may swiftly find
himself requiring an explicit and positive policy to serve. This contrasts with
the strategist engaging in a campaign of denying control, who must merely
identify an undesirable outcome to oppose. Operational success in denying
control over time merely pressures one’s opponent without unduly testing one’s
own policy. If a strategist is secure in his denying task, the onus to reevaluate
policy is entirely upon the enemy.
In contrast, a strategist aiming to assert control over another’s manipulation of power needs to have a clear idea not only of the unwanted outcomes
but also of those that are wanted. A successful campaign to take and subsequently exercise control requires knowing what that control is to accomplish.
Control signifies ownership, due in part to a force’s inherent tasks of taking
and protecting, which adhere to landpower alone. Ownership is established by
control over not only a geographical area and the sources of power therein but
also the manipulation of power in that area over time. Achieving and exercising
control is to lay claim to the lion’s portion of responsibility for events thereafter. Wisdom in policy is requisite as much as in grand strategy. Those with a
negative, denying, purpose do not have this worry, for they do not lay claim to
controlling the pattern of events. This is the tragedy of the Iraq invasion, for the
identified policy goal—regime change—was only achievable through use of
landpower, but landpower was the wrong grand strategic tool. Its nature clashed
with the other major goal of policy—to leave Iraqi nation-building solely to
the Iraqis, resulting in fundamental contradiction between policy and grand
strategy over the question of ownership and control.
Assuming responsibility for events is courageous both politically and
personally, particularly during conflict and its aftermath. The extent to which
any one actor may control events is subject to myriad pressures beyond a strategist’s command; such pressures disrupt the ability to control without reducing
either public expectation or operational requirements. Friction, uncertainty
and, above all, danger pervade war. They comprise the second aspect of the
bravery involved in committing to using landpower. These factors dilute the
ability of a strategist to control the pattern of adversarial power manipulation.
Friction represents those unknowable events that hamper the execution of strategy and separate it from strategic theory. Its potential is present
wherever there is a “moving part” in the employed tool of power. Landpower,
of all forms of power, has perhaps the greatest density of such moving parts,
particularly so if one considers all the support it requires to operate effectively.
Each soldier, and each piece of equipment or technology he or she operates, is
a distinct moving part. Land, moreover, magnifies the effects of friction in two
ways. First, the sea and air are broadly uniform mediums, notwithstanding the
effects of climate or changing weather. Land is not, with important implications
ranging from the tactical to the strategic. “Terrain” is a meaningful term only
with reference to land, and its variety poses unique challenges. Second, warfare
and the weather can change the character of particular aspects of the physical
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terrain, with direct implications for tactics; one need only think of the effect of
prolonged artillery bombardment during World War I. Landpower is innately
more difficult to use than airpower or seapower as there are, from the outset,
more natural barriers to its effective employment, and artificial obstructions
can be easily produced.
Uncertainty is so pervasive that it becomes the defining context for
the practice of strategy: “[s]trategy is a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and
ambiguity dominate.”11 Strategy, by default, exists because of uncertainty:
“wars usually begin when fighting nations disagree on their relative strength.”12
Strategy is the instrument for proving, through war, that one political actor is
more powerful than another. There are two ways in which uncertainty impacts
strategy and landpower. First, strategy manipulates uncertainty in war. Second,
uncertainty exists in the geopolitical context in which war occurs, and events
beyond a strategist’s control in war may influence the conduct of or the strategic
significance of the war itself.
Every strategic activity concerning control—denying, taking, exercising—has an individual, manipulative relationship with uncertainty. Denying
control means maximizing uncertainty for the opponent, so he cannot know
how to escape the stalemate within the limits of his resources. Simultaneously,
denying control has the side effect of maximizing uncertainty for oneself as
well, for a strategist denying control, unable to employ a force capable of wresting victory, cannot know when his foe will abandon his policy. Without some
type of rupture, war becomes a contest of endurance. Taking control, a path
available only to landpower, means decreasing the uncertainty a strategist faces
by beginning or threatening to begin the process of removing the adversary’s
sources of power from his possession. Exercising control is the execution of the
process of removal, resulting in an ever-decreasing amount of uncertainty both
for oneself and the enemy. Uncertainty cannot be eliminated; even throughout
the most successful exercise of control a strategist will face questions concerning the details of continued employment of force. The enemy also faces
a decrease in uncertainty when faced with a campaign of successful exercise
of control, although the resulting certainty is a negative one, as he comes to
grips with the conclusion that he will be defeated. The adversary always has an
influence on this competition over defining the level of uncertainty in conflict.
The end thus becomes certain, but the particular means or ways of reaching
that end remain inexact.
Uncertainty, moreover, pervades not only the climate of conflict but
also its regional and global context. Committing any form of power to the
solution of a particular problem is based on temporally locked assumptions
about the opponent, the contextual geopolitical situation, and the utility of that
application of power against that foe in that circumstance. The fundamental
assumptions may be incorrect, but even if they are not, the passage of time
modifies all factors, usually gradually but sometimes dramatically. When US
landpower was committed to the defense of South Vietnam, the nightmare of
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strategists in Washington was the emergence of a Beijing-Hanoi-Jakarta axis
of aggressive communist states and the subsequent collapse of dominoes across
Southeast Asia. Yet no sooner had US landpower been committed, than Indonesia
abruptly overthrew its Communist government and China disengaged significantly from much of the international stage, content to suffer the paroxysms of
the Cultural Revolution. The US landpower commitment to South Vietnam had
lost its grand strategic utility as the geopolitical context transformed around
it. Neither policy nor grand strategy can predict such surprising and upsetting
events, but policy and strategy must remain attuned to their influence. Control
has its limits and holds little direct relevance to those outside the immediate
competitive relationship, yet the impact of unexpected events may profoundly
affect the assumptions underpinning the struggle for that control.
Danger is the result of military strategy, “the art of the dialectic of
force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using
force to resolve their dispute.”13 Danger in conflict arises out of the adversarial
interaction of two opponents for control. It comes in many forms. First, the
danger of failure is ever present. The enemy has a vote in the outcome of the
conflict and he may ultimately become the one in control. The quality of one’s
military strategy relative to the opponent’s is ever important. Second, escalation is a constant danger. The stymied strategist may choose escalation as a
way of breaking an unyielding situation, whether it is a denial of control by the
enemy, the foe’s acquisition of control, or the foe’s reluctance to bend his will
during one’s own exercise of control. The escalation may concern even those
parties beyond the immediate conflict, for good or ill. Finally, the bedrock of
danger consists not of escalation or failure but of death and destruction. Danger
manifests itself most clearly in casualties taken and inflicted, and destruction
suffered or dealt. Nearly all forms of power are able to eschew danger to some
extent. Seapower and airpower, in particular, have shown they may eschew it
entirely, albeit at a cost of reduced effect. Only landpower cannot avoid danger
while retaining effectiveness; one must be in the theater. The best method is to
fight and win quickly, which maximizes danger in the short term to minimize
it in the long term.
These three factors—friction, uncertainty, and danger—indicate
control cannot be absolute even when achieved. The actual achievement of
control is difficult, and may be beset by a foe’s countercampaign of denying
control. The outright commitment to controlling and owning the future pattern
of power manipulation in a particular geographical space is thus politically courageous for the politicians at home as for the generals in the theater. “Detractors
stand ever ready to magnify a policy or strategy’s errors or limitations. Even
success is open to criticism from pundits who question policy or strategy’s
role, methods, or continued validity.”14 These detractors and pundits may be
domestic or international, official or unofficial, may represent only themselves
or great swathes of opinion, and may or may not have strategic, political, or
even policy implications. Even when committing landpower and taking control
is the best available choice, such deep involvement into a geopolitical issue and
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chosen goals will have to be justified at the outset and again following every
setback, real or perceived, in accomplishing the objectives set.

Conclusion
Control determines the character of power manipulation by a particular
political or strategic actor, or collection of actors, in a particular area over time.
Landpower exclusively may take and exercise control, allowing the strategist to
establish the character of power manipulation. This is achieved through taking
and protecting two of the three elementary tasks of force. Taking control and
exercising that control are the greatest threats one strategic actor can pose to
another, for their theoretical conclusion is the destruction of the threatened
actor as an independent political player.
Control is not an unalloyed good. Its negative aspects are manifold.
First, one assumes responsibility for the consequences of the attempt to rewrite
the future pattern of power manipulation. Control is ownership, and when that
ownership rules over the future of a foreign country, it will be closely scrutinized by all, for reasons that may be moral, political, strategic, or educative.
Onlookers, even allies and domestic constituents, may disagree on the desirability of the new character of power manipulation or on the cost, or even the
viability, of achieving it. Friction impedes control. Uncertainty within conflict
mitigates it, and uncertainty without conflict influences its usefulness. Danger
reflects the substantial costs of attempting control, in its overall utility as in its
human losses.
There is latitude in international politics for disinterest or for lower
levels of involvement. Landpower does not have to claim utility in every possible contingency nor should it. Choices on commitments need to consider
not only one’s own stake in a dispute but also the potential foe’s. There will
frequently be mismatched political wills. Landpower may be the only plausible
solution, but it is one which strategists and politicians are loathe to employ.
Other times, hurting the enemy and denying him control over his immediate
future without actually taking or exercising control are sufficient to bend, if
not break, his political will and bring him to the peace table. Forms of power
besides landpower are meaningful because not all geopolitical issues require
the most definitive use of power to postpone, resolve, or redirect.
Landpower, of all tools of power, faces the greatest impediments, risks,
and dangers in its use. These perils are handmaidens to its unique strengths,
and so the two cannot be separated. Landpower fulfils a particular, unique
role, suited to political issues of great intensity and importance—issues worth
owning. It is the role of policymakers and strategists together to establish compatibility among policy goals, grand strategy, and the tools of power. “If the
strategist is forced to strive for final and ultimate control, he must establish, or
must present the inevitable prospect, a man on the scene with a gun. This is the
soldier.”15 Landpower is indeed the strongest—and in the context of friction,
uncertainty, danger, and, above all, necessity for political ownership, also the
bravest—tool among equals.
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